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LIRA@BC Law

Abstract

As empirical evidence of labor-market concentration mounts, academics and policymakers advance proposals to challenge or reverse its effects on workers’ wages and labor-market options. Prominent among these is more aggressive review of the labor-market effects of mergers by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). My forthcoming essay, Interagency Merger Review in Labor Markets, argues for an alternative intervention: N.

Increasing evidence of labor market concentration and mergers’ suppressive effects on wages has drawn attention to labor market regulation by antitrust scholars and enforcers, creating an unprecedented reform effort to apply antitrust law to employers. Proposals have concentrated on more through DOJ and FTC merger review to reduce labor market concentration and mitigate its effects – including reduced hiring, artificially suppressed compensation, employer collusion, and increasing inequality – by ensuring robust labor market competition.

While important in their own right, these proposals focus exclusively on reforming antitrust agencies’ merger review. They do not contend with the limitations of exclusive antitrust agency jurisdiction as a doctrinal, prophylactic, institutional, and expertise-based matter, and they ignore the benefits of interagency labor market regulation.

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Hafiz_Why_We_Need_Interagency_Merger_Review_A1b.pdf
7 Sep 2022
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Metadata

  • Subject
    • Labor and Employment Law

    • Trade Regulation

  • Journal title
    • The CLS Blue Sky Blog

  • Date submitted

    7 September 2022

  • Additional information