Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost Redistribution in Antidumping Cases

Abstract

U.S. antidumping laws exist so that domestic markets can protect themselves against foreign goods sold in the United States at less than fair market value. In an antidumping case, after the initial petition is filed, all costs of investigation and determination fall on the U.S. government. Those companies and markets alleged of dumping, however, must pay for their own defense, diverting money from industry development to defense of their actions. A majority of the antidumping cases filed result in a de minimis or zero antidumping margin, but the costs of achieving such a result weigh heavily on the accused market. This Note explores the application and results of U.S. antidumping laws on U.S. and foreign companies and the distribution of costs in their application. Using the Salmon Case from Chile as an example, it argues that in order to eliminate frivolous and protectionist antidumping actions, the petitioners should bear the costs of investigation and discovery instead of the government.