Beyond Reproach? The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Supreme Court's Inability to Nullify Executive Interpretations of What Constitutes a Nongrave Breach of the Geneva Conventions

Abstract

In response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, authorizing the President, to determine what actions related to the treatment of suspected terrorist detainees constitute nongrave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. This Note examines how the Supreme Court should decide a case challenging one of the President's interpretations of what behavior falls within that category. It first examines the relevant cases including those addressing the power of the President to direct foreign policy, the political question doctrine, the implications of the legislative branch's authorization of executive actions, the Chevron doctrine, and treaty interpretation principles. It next applies the law in each of these areas to the President's authority tinder the Military Commissions Act and determines that any challenge to the President's authority pursuant to this Act should be either dismissed as nonjusticiable, or a decision should be rendered in favor of the President's interpretation. This Note concludes broffering other methods through which persons could bring a halt to offensive, torturous behavior.