Abstract
Since the 1990s, “vulture” hedge funds have made fabulous returns by pursuing a controversial strategy: buying bonds issued by countries in or near default and then suing those countries for full repayment. Vulture funds’ investments have resulted in chaotic, drawn-out default episodes and an enormous redistribution of wealth from developing countries to billionaire investors. Despite the real benefits vultures provide to the secondary market for sovereign debt, something must be done to dull their talons. Lamentably, however, no viable solution currently exists. This Note argues that a nonprofit fund designed to compete with vultures could at least mitigate harm to developing nations during the next wave of defaults.
Files
Metadata
- Subject
Banking and Finance Law
Bankruptcy Law
Law and Economics
Nonprofit Organizations Law
- Journal title
Boston College Law Review
- Volume
61
- Issue
5
- Pagination
1819
- Date submitted
6 September 2022