People are generally skeptical that someone would falsely confess to a crime he or she did not commit. Nonetheless, a myriad of convicts exonerated by DNA and the rapidly emerging scientific literature on the subject calls into question this long-standing belief. Scholars in the field now recognize that personal and situational risk factors, including promises of leniency, heighten the risk of a false confession. Promises of leniency have been shown to be particularly coercive in interrogations and to produce unusually persuasive testimony in the courtroom. Due to a failure to recognize the power behind these promises, our justice system does not adequately safeguard criminal defendants who give promise-induced confessions. As such, federal appellate courts are in disarray over when a promise of leniency renders a confession inadmissible at trial. On the other hand, the power behind promises in the plea-bargaining context is better recognized by scholars and laypeople alike and our justice system consequently provides much greater safeguards to criminal defendants who plead guilty in response to a promise. This Note argues that jury instructions that help the jury better detect, understand, and weigh confession testimony can close the unwarranted gap between procedural safeguards governing promise-induced admissions of guilt during plea discussions and interrogations. This Note also proposes a model instruction, which conveys the relevant scientific and legal principles in a way that will impact jurors’ verdicts in false confession cases.

Boston College Law Review

Promise-Induced False Confessions: Lessons from Promises in Another Context

On May 11, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in <em>Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna</em>, held that the protected status of a public employee’s speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim remains one of law, rather than one of mixed law and fact. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit disallowed jury determinations on the fact-intensive inquiry into the protected status of the employee’s speech. This Comment argues that despite having the invaluable opportunity—as a historically conservative court—to defend the voices of public employees, the Sixth Circuit continued its obliteration of public employees’ right to a jury trial. This Comment further argues that the Sixth Circuit’s decision could leave much of private sector misconduct unreported.

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